CVE-2026-47068

Cross-session PubSub topic injection via URL parameter in phoenix_storybook

Published May 20, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 2.3 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows cross-session PubSub topic injection via a URL query parameter. An attacker who loads the component iframe with the topic of another session receives the control messages that the victim's playground sends to its iframe.

PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive.handle_params/3 reads a PubSub topic from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it, with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The playground uses the received pid as the target of its later messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads). Releases published as phx_live_storybook have the same code in PhxLiveStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive.

This issue affects phoenix_storybook: from 0.5.0 before 1.1.0; phx_live_storybook: from 0.4.0 onward.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-mrhx-6pw9-q5fh PhoenixStorybook has cross-session PubSub topic injection via URL parameter
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows cross-session PubSub topic injection via a URL query parameter. 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive':handle_params/3 in lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/component_iframe_live.ex reads a PubSub topic directly from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The shared PhoenixStorybook.PubSub is used to coordinate playground LiveViews with their iframes: a playground subscribes to a session-specific topic and uses the received iframe pid to direct subsequent control messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads) via send/2. Because the iframe trusts the query parameter, an attacker who loads /storybook/iframe/<story>?topic=<victim_topic> causes their iframe process pid to be announced on the victim's topic. The victim's playground then addresses its private messages to the attacker's iframe process. This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.4.0 before 1.1.0. Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows cross-session PubSub topic injection via a URL query parameter. An attacker who loads the component iframe with the topic of another session receives the control messages that the victim's playground sends to its iframe. PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive.handle_params/3 reads a PubSub topic from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it, with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The playground uses the received pid as the target of its later messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads). Releases published as phx_live_storybook have the same code in PhxLiveStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive. This issue affects phoenix_storybook: from 0.5.0 before 1.1.0; phx_live_storybook: from 0.4.0 onward.
References
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in phenixdigital phoenix_storybook allows cross-session PubSub topic injection via a URL query parameter. 'Elixir.PhoenixStorybook.Story.ComponentIframeLive':handle_params/3 in lib/phoenix_storybook/live/story/component_iframe_live.ex reads a PubSub topic directly from params["topic"] and broadcasts {:component_iframe_pid, self()} on it with no check that the topic belongs to the requesting session. The shared PhoenixStorybook.PubSub is used to coordinate playground LiveViews with their iframes: a playground subscribes to a session-specific topic and uses the received iframe pid to direct subsequent control messages (variation state, theme switches, extra-assign payloads) via send/2. Because the iframe trusts the query parameter, an attacker who loads /storybook/iframe/<story>?topic=<victim_topic> causes their iframe process pid to be announced on the victim's topic. The victim's playground then addresses its private messages to the attacker's iframe process. This issue affects phoenix_storybook from 0.4.0 before 1.1.0.
Title Cross-session PubSub topic injection via URL parameter in phoenix_storybook
First Time appeared Phenixdigital
Phenixdigital phoenix Storybook
Weaknesses CWE-639
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:phenixdigital:phoenix_storybook:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Phenixdigital
Phenixdigital phoenix Storybook
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
EEF
Published
Updated
Nov 20, 2026, 7:56 AM
Reserved
May 18, 2026, 5:28 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
May 20, 2026, 2:17 PM
Modified
Nov 20, 2026, 8:18 AM