In JetBrains Ktor before 3.6.1 a DoS attack was possible via the CIO engine
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NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in DependencyGraph traversal causes denial of service via deep dependency chains
NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit) is a suite of open source Python modules, data sets, and tutorials supporting research and development in Natural Language Processing. In 3.10.3 and earlier, DependencyGraph._tree and triples recurse once per dependency edge without a depth bound, and get_cycle_path also lacks a visited-set termination guard. A deeply chained or cyclic attacker-controlled CoNLL or Malt-TAB dependency structure can raise RecursionError and abort a parse worker. This issue is fixed in version 3.10.4.
NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in WordNet Synset hypernym walkers (max_depth/min_depth/hypernym_paths/hypernym_distances) causes DoS
NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit) is a suite of open source Python modules, data sets, and tutorials supporting research and development in Natural Language Processing. Prior to 3.10.4, WordNet Synset.max_depth, min_depth, hypernym_paths, and hypernym_distances recursively follow attacker-controlled corpus pointers without a visited-node set or depth cap. A cyclic or excessively deep hypernym graph can raise RecursionError and terminate traversal APIs and similarity operations that depend on them. This issue is fixed in version 3.10.4.
NLTK: Downloader cyclic collection indices cause an infinite closure walk
NLTK (Natural Language Toolkit) is a suite of open source Python modules, data sets, and tutorials supporting research and development in Natural Language Processing. From 3.6.7 until 3.10.4, nltk.downloader follows collection membership without tracking already visited collection nodes. A self-referencing or mutually referencing collection index can therefore make the package-closure walk loop indefinitely while its queue and memory usage grow, denying service when a victim processes the attacker-influenced index. This issue is fixed in version 3.10.4.
mm/shmem: fix accounting of swapin-error markers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix accounting of swapin-error markers A failed swap read replaces the swap entry with a swapin-error marker in the page-cache and subtracts its pages from "alloced" and "swapped"; however, it leaves their block charge in place. Removing the marker during truncate then subtracts from "swapped" again. This can underflow the counters or make swapped reach zero while other pages remain swapped out, causing swapoff to loop without finding them. When installing the marker, subtract only from "swapped" and let shmem_recalc_inode() reduce "alloced" and release the block charge. Make shmem_free_swap() report successful removal separately from the number of swap pages freed, so removing a swapin-error marker does not subtract from "swapped" again. It's a bit confusing, but replacing a swapped out page by a swapin-error marker in shmem_set_folio_swapin_error() behaves as follows: Initially: alloced=1, swapped=1, nrpages=0 Calling shmem_recalc_inode(inode, 0, -1) -> swapped = 0 -> freed = 1 - 0 - 0 = 1 -> alloced -= freed -> alloced=0, swapped=0, block charge released
ClamAV InstallShield Parser Infinite Loop Leading to Denial of Service in Cisco Secure Endpoint
A vulnerability in the InstallShield file parser of ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to incomplete error checking when the InstallShield File Parser is performing a scan. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted InstallShield file to be scanned. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the ClamAV scanning process to terminate due to an infinite loop, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software.
A vulnerability in Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file scanning of ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to a logic error when scanning the CHM file and following the internal file pointers. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted CHM file for scanning. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the ClamAV decode process to terminate due to an infinite loop, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software.
Convert::ASN1 versions before 0.37 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via unbounded MSG_PEEK buffer doubling in asn_recv
Convert::ASN1 versions before 0.37 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via unbounded MSG_PEEK buffer doubling in asn_recv. asn_recv peeks the socket in a loop, doubling the buffer size on each pass until a tag and length can be decoded. An inverted boolean guard ($tb || rather than $tb &&) prevents the need-more-data exit from firing once a tag byte has been decoded. When asn_decode_length returns no value because the length is absent or incomplete, no exit fires for that case either. MSG_PEEK leaves socket data unconsumed, so each re-peek returns at once while the buffer size doubles. A single truncated BER header sent to a process calling asn_recv doubles the peek buffer until memory is exhausted. Perl's realloc failure is fatal and not catchable with eval.
Infinite loop in IPv6 Router Advertisement handling when the RA omits the source link-layer address option
The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery code in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c flushes a neighbour's queued packets at the end of handle_ra_input(). The Source Link-Layer Address Option (SLLAO) is optional in a Router Advertisement; when it is absent, handle_ra_input() still obtains (or creates) a neighbour cache entry for the RA source via net_ipv6_nbr_add() with a NULL link-layer address, so the entry stays in NET_IPV6_NBR_STATE_INCOMPLETE with nbr->idx == NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN. The pending-packet drain loop was entered unconditionally for that unresolved entry. Each net_send_data() in the drain loop runs synchronously into net_ipv6_prepare_for_send(), which finds the neighbour still unresolved and hands the packet to net_ipv6_send_ns(), which puts it straight back onto the same pending_queue. The loop therefore never sees an empty queue. With a single queued packet it transmits a fresh Neighbor Solicitation on every iteration; with two or more queued packets it rotates the queue with no allocation and no transmission at all. The loop runs in the network RX thread with the global IPv6 neighbour mutex held. An unauthenticated attacker on the same link can trigger this deterministically: advertise itself as a router, induce the victim to queue off-link traffic toward that router (for example by sending echo requests with an off-link source address) while leaving the solicitation unanswered, then send a second Router Advertisement without an SLLAO option. Spoofing an SLLAO-less RA from the legitimate router's link-local address has the same effect whenever traffic is queued for it. Router Advertisements are processed with no authentication whenever CONFIG_NET_IPV6_ND is enabled, which is the default for IPv6-capable builds. The result is a permanent denial of service: the RX thread spins forever holding the neighbour lock, so all IPv6 transmission and every other user of the neighbour cache blocks, and the Neighbor Advertisement that would resolve the entry can no longer be processed. The ipv6_ns_reply_timer work item that would normally drop the pending packets also blocks on the same mutex. In the single-packet variant the loop additionally floods the link with Neighbor Solicitations. The fix restricts the flush to resolved entries (nbr->idx != NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN), leaving the packets queued for the NS reply timeout. There is no memory-safety impact.
Integer Overflow or Wraparound in Wireshark
Multiple protocol dissector crashes and infinite loops, and memory leaks in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') in Wireshark
Multiple protocol dissector infinite loops in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Uncontrolled Recursion in Wireshark
Matter protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in Wireshark
Multiple protocol dissector and file parser hangs in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity in Wireshark
Ascend file parser large loop in 4.6.0 to 4.6.9 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.19 allows denial of service
mm/shmem: fix truncate hang in large swap entry
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shmem: fix truncate hang in large swap entry Truncating a tmpfs file or memfd to a page-aligned size inside a large swap entry can loop indefinitely in shmem_undo_range(). The task holds the inode lock and cannot be killed. A large swap entry represents a whole swapped-out folio. For example, truncate a file whose pages 0-7 share one swap entry to four pages: [ 0 1 2 3 | 4 5 6 7 ] keep | discard ^ new EOF, start = 4 i_size has already been updated when boundary handling asks shmem_get_partial_folio() for page 4. Since it is swapped out, the helper calls shmem_get_folio() with SGP_READ. That rejects page 4 with -EINVAL because its starting offset equals i_size. Nothing is read back. The final scan cannot free the entry without losing pages 0-3. It skips it, restarts from start = 4, and finds it again indefinitely. An unaligned truncate avoids this particular failure because the requested page starts below i_size. Folios already in the page-cache cannot trigger it as the direct lookup will return them beyond EOF. Fix it by letting shmem_get_partial_folio() call shmem_swapin_folio() directly for swap entries. This bypasses the read path's i_size check, allowing the existing boundary handling to zero and split the folio. If swap-in returns a smaller folio, it also splits the swap entry so the final scan can free the entries beyond EOF. Retry the lookup if the entry changes during swap-in. Handling swap-in allocation failures remains broken and is unchanged by this commit. Even when shmem_swapin_folio() correctly returns -ENOMEM instead of -EEXIST, shmem_get_partial_folio() returns NULL and shmem_undo_range() skips boundary handling. If the large swap entry remains intact, truncation can still loop in the final scan, while hole punching can return without zeroing the boundary. This may read an entire large folio back from swap while holding i_rwsem, only to discard part of it. Avoiding that I/O would require splitting both the swap entry and any large folio still in the swap cache. That, however, is much bigger work.
SUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached Writing the same socket descriptor to /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist twice attaches a second svc_sock to one socket. svc_setup_socket() saves the socket's callbacks before installing its own, so the second attach records svc_write_space() as the old write_space callback. svc_udp_init() invokes that callback by way of svc_sock_setbufsize(), and svc_write_space() then calls itself until the kernel stack is exhausted: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc900037d7ff8 svc_write_space+0x90/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:429 svc_write_space+0xe6/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:430 ... 700 more ... svc_sock_setbufsize+0x18d/0x220 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:386 svc_udp_init net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:854 [inline] svc_setup_socket+0xb2f/0x1090 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1498 svc_addsock+0x2fd/0x760 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1547 __write_ports_addfd fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:742 [inline] write_ports+0xa5b/0xcc0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:861 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x106/0x1a0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:112 svc_data_ready() and svc_tcp_state_change() chain through their saved callbacks the same way, so a TCP descriptor added twice recurses on the next incoming segment instead. Reaching any of this takes a writer on portlist, and the nfsd filesystem sets no FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so the reproducer needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace. Reject a socket that already carries sk_user_data. svc_setup_socket() overwrites that field unconditionally, so a socket some other consumer has claimed is one NFSD would corrupt whether or not the callbacks recurse.
NFSD: Destroy a recalled delegation the client does not hold
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Destroy a recalled delegation the client does not hold A client that answers CB_RECALL with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE or NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID has no record of the delegation, so the FREE_STATEID that clears it from cl_revoked never arrives. Every later SEQUENCE reply carries SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED, and the client loops issuing TEST_STATEID. Destroy such a delegation when it is reaped rather than revoking it onto cl_revoked. RFC 8881 Section 20.2.4 completes the recall at the reply when its status is neither NFS4_OK nor NFS4ERR_DELAY, so a rejected recall leaves nothing to revoke. An administrative revoke keeps that path, since NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED reports it. A destroyed stateid returns NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead of NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED. A client that rejects the recall but still holds the delegation gets no notice that its state was revoked. CB_RECALL can outrun the reply that granted the delegation, so honor a rejection only once the client has seen that grant. Per RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.3, retirement of the slot that carried the grant is that proof; retry until then, and revoke when the retries lapse.
vringh: bound top-level re-entry into indirect tables
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vringh: bound top-level re-entry into indirect tables In __vringh_iov(), the F_INDIRECT branch descends into the indirect table and continues before the descriptor accounting runs. A top-level indirect descriptor is therefore never charged to count. If such a descriptor sets NEXT to point back at itself, returning from the indirect table resumes at the same top-level descriptor, which is again not counted, so the walk never makes forward progress. Because count stays flat and indirect_count is reset to 0 on every return to the top-level table, neither bound in the loop check trips. A guest can spin the vringh worker at 100% CPU inside __vringh_iov(), an uninterruptible host DoS. Move the descriptor accounting above the indirect switch so that a top-level indirect descriptor is charged one top-level traversal step before the walk descends into its table, bringing this re-entry under the existing vrh->vring.num bound. Each top-level descriptor is still charged at most one step and indirect_count still bounds a single table, so legitimate chains (including the multiple-indirect case in tools/virtio/vringh_test.c) stay within vring.num, while a cyclic indirect descriptor is now rejected with -ELOOP.
xfs: don't try to scrub self-referential dirent in metapath checker
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: don't try to scrub self-referential dirent in metapath checker LOLLM observes that the _ilock_both helper will loop forever trying to double-lock the same inode if mpath->dp == sc->ip. Callers are not supposed to call us with parent == child because that makes no sense. Trigger an assertion, mark the scan incomplete, and return IO error so that this fails noisily.
KVM: x86/mmu: Conditionally resched when retrying gPTE walk on A/D update failure
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Conditionally resched when retrying gPTE walk on A/D update failure Conditionally reschedule when retrying a guest PTE walk because the CMPXCHG to update A/D bits failed, e.g. because a different task/vCPU modified the relevant gPTEs. On kernels without involuntary preemption of some kind, a misbehaving guest can "capture" a pCPU effectively indefinitely and trigger soft lockups by continuously modifying its gPTEs such that the result of the walk is remains valid.