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CVE-2026-95825

Reference-count underflow in Zephyr network interface address removal releases an IP address that is still in use

net_if_ipv4_addr_rm() and net_if_ipv6_addr_rm() in subsys/net/ip/net_if.c unconditionally called net_if_addr_unref() on the target address. When an earlier removal could not complete because another subsystem still held a reference (the TCP stack takes one on the local address of every connection, in tcp_conn_new() and on connect()), the address is left in place with is_added cleared and is_used still set. A second removal of such an address decremented the reference count again, consuming a reference owned by that other holder. When it was the last one, the address slot was released, its NET_EVENT_IPV*_ADDR_DEL event fired, and the slot became reusable while the holder still believed it owned a reference. Every address lookup helper matches on is_used and not on is_added, so a half-removed address stays visible to the rest of the stack and repeat removals are readily reachable from remote input. Under IPv6 SLAAC, an on-link node that sends a Router Advertisement with a short valid lifetime causes the address to expire into the deferred state; a refreshing Router Advertisement is handled by net_if_ipv6_addr_update_lifetime(), which re-arms the lifetime timer without restoring the reference, so the next expiry performs the second, reference-stealing removal. With CONFIG_NET_IPV4_ACD and DHCPv4, repeated spoofed ARP conflicts for the device's lease drive dhcpv4_acd_event_handler() into calling net_if_ipv4_addr_rm() more than once on the same address. Where CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled, the net_if_ipv4_addr_rm_by_index() and net_if_ipv6_addr_rm_by_index() system calls let an unprivileged user-mode thread trigger the same kernel-side release deterministically. The impact is loss of a configured IP address while connections are still using it, and a corrupted reference count that propagates: the slot can be handed to a newly added address, and when the stale holder later tears down, net_if_addr_unref() resolves the address by value and drops the new incarnation's only reference, removing a live address a second time. The affected objects are static array slots and the counter is never decremented below zero, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure; the consequence is denial of service against the device's network connectivity, repeatable at the attacker's pace. The fix resolves the address before touching the reference count and returns false without calling net_if_addr_unref() when the address is already marked as removed, so the public removal API can no longer consume a reference it does not own.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-95826

Out-of-bounds write in the SMSC911x Ethernet driver when transmitting frames larger than the staging buffer

The SMSC911x/LAN9220 Ethernet driver stages every outgoing frame in a fixed-size static buffer before pushing it to the controller FIFO. eth_tx() in drivers/ethernet/eth_smsc911x.c took the frame length from net_pkt_get_len(pkt) and passed it directly to net_pkt_read(pkt, tx_buf, total_len), with no comparison against the size of tx_buf (NET_ETH_MAX_FRAME_SIZE). net_pkt_read() takes no destination size and only fails when the packet is shorter than the requested length, so any packet longer than the staging buffer was copied past its end. Nothing between the IP layer and the driver bounds the frame to what the link can carry: ethernet_send() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c performs no length check, and the IPv6 output path only compares the packet against the interface MTU when CONFIG_NET_IPV6_FRAGMENT is enabled (it is disabled by default). The size the stack will build is therefore governed by the interface MTU, and that MTU is remotely settable: handle_ra_input() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c honours the MTU option of any Router Advertisement with a value up to 0xffff, gated only by the standard hop-limit-255 and link-local-source checks. An unauthenticated attacker on the same link can raise the MTU and then have the device emit a single frame of several kilobytes, for example as a TCP segment from any service that returns more than ~1.5 KB or as an oversized UDP datagram. The result is an out-of-bounds write into .bss immediately after tx_buf, with the overrun length and much of its content derived from the transmitted frame. Consequences range from corruption of adjacent kernel data and a crash to potential control-flow influence where the clobbered globals hold pointers; the practical overrun size is bounded by the network buffer pool rather than by the advertised MTU. The fix rejects frames larger than NET_ETH_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with -EMSGSIZE before any TX_DATA_PORT write, so the controller FIFO is also not left holding a command word without its payload.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-95827

Network packet reference leak in IPv6 Router Advertisement handling leads to buffer pool exhaustion

The IPv6 neighbour discovery code in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c keeps packets that are waiting for address resolution on a per-neighbour pending queue. A queued packet holds two references: the one handed over by the sender and a second one taken by net_ipv6_send_ns() when the packet is put on the queue. The Router Advertisement handler handle_ra_input() popped each packet off the queue and passed it to net_send_data(), relying on a trailing nbr_clear_ns_pending() call to release the queue reference — but that call then found the queue already empty and released nothing, so one reference was leaked for every pending packet flushed on an RA. Router Advertisements are unauthenticated link-local ICMPv6 messages, so any node on the same link can trigger the flush. An attacker can make the leak deterministic by advertising itself as a router without a source link-layer address option, so the victim's neighbour entry stays INCOMPLETE, then inducing the victim to transmit through that next hop (the packet is queued and a neighbour solicitation is sent), leaving the solicitation unanswered and sending a further RA to drain the queue. Each round leaks one struct net_pkt together with its net_buf chain. Leaked packets are never returned to the fixed-size pools, so the loss is permanent for the lifetime of the boot. With CONFIG_NET_PKT_TX_COUNT defaulting to 4 (14 with CONFIG_NET_PKT_LARGE_DEFAULTS), a small number of repetitions exhausts the transmit packet slab and the node stops being able to send any traffic. The impact is availability only: the reference count is always too high, never too low, so no use-after-free or memory corruption arises. The fix moves the flush into a helper, nbr_send_pending(), which releases the queue reference for every packet it takes off the queue before handing the remaining reference to net_send_data(), and releases that one too if the send is refused.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-95824

Infinite loop in IPv6 Router Advertisement handling when the RA omits the source link-layer address option

The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery code in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c flushes a neighbour's queued packets at the end of handle_ra_input(). The Source Link-Layer Address Option (SLLAO) is optional in a Router Advertisement; when it is absent, handle_ra_input() still obtains (or creates) a neighbour cache entry for the RA source via net_ipv6_nbr_add() with a NULL link-layer address, so the entry stays in NET_IPV6_NBR_STATE_INCOMPLETE with nbr->idx == NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN. The pending-packet drain loop was entered unconditionally for that unresolved entry. Each net_send_data() in the drain loop runs synchronously into net_ipv6_prepare_for_send(), which finds the neighbour still unresolved and hands the packet to net_ipv6_send_ns(), which puts it straight back onto the same pending_queue. The loop therefore never sees an empty queue. With a single queued packet it transmits a fresh Neighbor Solicitation on every iteration; with two or more queued packets it rotates the queue with no allocation and no transmission at all. The loop runs in the network RX thread with the global IPv6 neighbour mutex held. An unauthenticated attacker on the same link can trigger this deterministically: advertise itself as a router, induce the victim to queue off-link traffic toward that router (for example by sending echo requests with an off-link source address) while leaving the solicitation unanswered, then send a second Router Advertisement without an SLLAO option. Spoofing an SLLAO-less RA from the legitimate router's link-local address has the same effect whenever traffic is queued for it. Router Advertisements are processed with no authentication whenever CONFIG_NET_IPV6_ND is enabled, which is the default for IPv6-capable builds. The result is a permanent denial of service: the RX thread spins forever holding the neighbour lock, so all IPv6 transmission and every other user of the neighbour cache blocks, and the Neighbor Advertisement that would resolve the entry can no longer be processed. The ipv6_ns_reply_timer work item that would normally drop the pending packets also blocks on the same mutex. In the single-packet variant the loop additionally floods the link with Neighbor Solicitations. The fix restricts the flush to resolved entries (nbr->idx != NET_NBR_LLADDR_UNKNOWN), leaving the packets queued for the NS reply timeout. There is no memory-safety impact.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-95823

Use-after-free and net_buf leak in Zephyr TCP header linearization (tcp_pkt_linearize)

tcp_pkt_linearize() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c is used by th_get() whenever a received TCP header is not contiguous in a single net_buf. While pulling the header bytes out of the following fragments, the loop called net_buf_unref() on an emptied fragment without first detaching its frags pointer. net_buf_unref() walks the whole fragment list, so the payload buffers still linked behind that fragment were freed as well, and the stale pointer was then reinstalled into the packet as buf->frags, producing a use-after-free and a later double free during packet teardown. The same loop also advanced to second->frags unconditionally: when the fragment still held payload after the header remainder was pulled, it was spliced out of the packet without ever being unreferenced, permanently leaking that buffer and silently dropping the data it carried. The defect is reached from tcp_recv() via th_get() on every received TCP segment, before connection lookup or any header validation, so a single unauthenticated segment that matches a listening socket is sufficient. An attacker only needs the TCP header to straddle a net_buf boundary, which they can arrange from off-link: IPv6 extension headers are accepted on receive and their length is added to the header offset by th_get(), so a Destination Options header of a suitable length places the TCP header across the boundary of the fixed-size receive buffers (CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE). Packet chains assembled from several sources - IPv4/IPv6 reassembly, 6LoWPAN/802.15.4 reassembly, tunnel or virtual interfaces that strip an outer header, or drivers producing scatter-gather chains - can additionally present a short interior fragment that the loop empties exactly, which is the case that frees the remainder of the packet while it is still in use. The reliably reachable consequence is exhaustion of the receive buffer pool: each crafted segment leaks one net_buf from the fixed CONFIG_NET_BUF_RX_COUNT pool, the buffers are never reclaimed, and once the pool is empty the device can no longer receive network traffic until it is rebooted. Where a fragment is emptied exactly, the impact rises to memory corruption: freed pool buffers are written through by the remainder of the loop, their contents may be delivered to the application, and the packet is double-freed on teardown. The fix saves and clears second->frags before the net_buf_unref() so only the emptied header fragment is released, and advances to the next fragment only when second->len == 0, keeping any fragment that still holds payload in the packet. This restores the detach-before-unref ownership pattern used elsewhere in the stack, for example in net_pkt_trim_buffer().

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-95822

Out-of-bounds read and kernel stack disclosure in the SOCKS5 client when the destination address family differs from the proxy address family

The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5_tcp_connect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from the address family of the proxy (proxy->sa_family) while reading the bytes out of the destination address supplied to connect(). A SOCKS5 request encodes the destination independently of the transport used to reach the proxy, so the two families are unrelated and nothing in the path forces them to agree: set_context_proxy() only requires the proxy family to match the socket, and zsock_connect_ctx() enters the SOCKS branch before any destination validation. With an IPv6 proxy and an AF_INET destination the code treated an 8-byte struct net_sockaddr_in as a struct net_sockaddr_in6 and copied the 16-byte sin6_addr from it, reading 12 bytes past the end of the object and transmitting them to the proxy. With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, z_vrfy_zsock_connect() copies only addrlen user bytes into a stack-resident struct net_sockaddr_storage and enforces no per-family minimum length, so the oversized read stays within the storage but returns stale, uninitialised kernel-stack bytes. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore open an AF_INET6 stream socket, point setsockopt(SO_SOCKS5) at a proxy it controls, and call connect() with a short AF_INET destination to have the kernel send it 12 bytes of supervisor stack residue per attempt. Without CONFIG_USERSPACE the read runs past the end of the caller's own struct net_sockaddr_in, disclosing adjacent memory to the proxy; the family mismatch can arise unintentionally when a destination is obtained from DNS while an IPv6 proxy is configured. Impact is limited to information disclosure of at most 12 bytes per connect() call, with no write primitive; the leak is delivered to whoever operates the SOCKS5 proxy. The mirrored pairing (IPv6 destination through an IPv4 proxy) is memory-safe but encoded the destination as SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 from the first four bytes of the IPv6 address, causing the proxy to connect to an unrelated host. Exploitation requires the non-default CONFIG_SOCKS option, a socket with SO_SOCKS5 configured, and both IPv4 and IPv6 support in the image. The fix moves the encoding into a helper that selects the address type from dest->sa_family and validates dest_len against the matching struct net_sockaddr_in/struct net_sockaddr_in6 before copying, rejecting under-length or unsupported destinations with an error.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.3 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93671

Out-of-bounds read logging a mismatched Sec-WebSocket-Accept header in the Zephyr websocket client

The websocket client's HTTP header callback on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c receives the Sec-WebSocket-Accept header value as a pointer/length pair from the HTTP parser. The referenced bytes live inside the application-supplied receive buffer and are not NUL terminated. When the received value did not match the expected accept key, the pointer was passed directly to a %s conversion in a NET_DBG() call, so the logging code measured the string with strlen() and read on past the end of the header value looking for a terminator. The value is supplied by the peer during the WebSocket handshake, before any application-level authentication, so a malicious or man-in-the-middle server reached over a ws:// (or otherwise attacker-terminated) connection can trigger the mismatch branch at will simply by answering with a wrong accept key. By sizing the response so the header value ends at the tail of the buffer passed to websocket_connect() as wreq->tmp_buf, the peer can make the scan run off the end of that buffer and into adjacent memory. The defective log statement is compiled in only when websocket debug logging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_WEBSOCKET_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, or CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL=4); it is absent from a default build, which bounds exposure to diagnostic configurations. The consequence is an out-of-bounds read whose contents are emitted to the log stream: memory adjacent to the receive buffer is disclosed wherever the device's logs are collected or displayed. On targets where the memory following the buffer is not mapped, the scan can instead fault and terminate the connection or thread. No out-of-bounds write occurs, so there is no integrity impact. The fix copies at most sizeof(got) - 1 bytes of the parser-provided slice into a bounded stack buffer, NUL terminates the copy, and logs that instead, so the formatter never reads beyond the bytes the parser actually offered.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.7 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93673

WebSocket client accepts a handshake without verifying the full Sec-WebSocket-Accept value

The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx->sec_accept_ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec_accept_present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part. ctx->sec_accept_ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket_connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http_parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket_connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt_transport_websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c. The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence. The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on_header_field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.8 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93672

NULL pointer dereference in the Bluetooth host ATT request lookup (bt_att_find_req_by_user_data)

bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer. The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first. The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert. The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93670

Out-of-bounds write in the DesignWare I3C driver when the device address table is full

The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3c_dw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with get_free_pos(), which signals an exhausted table by returning -1. The helper declared its return type as uint8_t, so the sentinel was truncated to 255, and both consumers (dw_i3c_attach_device() and dw_i3c_i2c_attach_device()) also stored it in a uint8_t before testing if (pos < 0) — a comparison that is never true for an unsigned value. The exhaustion guard was therefore inert in every build. With the guard defeated, an attach attempted on a full DAT proceeds with pos == 255: it writes data->dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data[255].id, more than 200 bytes past the end of the 32-element dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data array and past the end of struct dw_i3c_data; it stores the resulting out-of-bounds address in desc->controller_priv, from which later detach, reattach and IBI operations read the slot index back; and it performs a 32-bit MMIO store 1020 bytes beyond the hardware DAT base, outside the table the controller reports. The attach still returns success, so the upper layer believes the device is bound. The DAT is smaller than the software array (its depth is read from DEVICE_ADDR_TABLE_POINTER, commonly 8 or 16 entries), so exhaustion is reachable. In a dual-role build (CONFIG_I3C_DUAL_ROLE with CONFIG_I3C_USE_IBI) acting as a secondary controller, the attach count is supplied by the bus's active controller: i3c_sec_handoffed() attaches one device per entry of the received DEFTGTS list, so a hostile or malfunctioning controller on the local I3C bus that declares more targets than the local DAT depth triggers the condition once per surplus entry. Exhaustion can also be reached from a devicetree that declares more devices than the table holds, or by repeated i3c attach shell commands. Impact is bounded: the out-of-bounds store is a single byte of fixed value at a fixed displacement, with no attacker-chosen data or offset, so the realistic outcomes are corruption of neighbouring static driver state, writes into reserved controller registers, and inconsistent driver bookkeeping (a crash or a wedged I3C bus) rather than a controllable memory-write primitive. The attack vector is the local chip-to-chip I3C bus; there is no network-reachable path.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.5 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93669

NULL pointer dereference in the ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend when a host transaction arrives before backend initialization

The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c arms the SPI peripheral before its receive context exists. shi_ite_init_registers() sets the state machine to SHI_STATE_READY_TO_RECV and calls irq_enable() while the device initializes at POST_KERNEL priority CONFIG_KERNEL_INIT_PRIORITY_DEFAULT (40), but data->rx_ctx and data->tx are only assigned later by shi_ite_backend_init(), which ec_host_cmd_init() invokes at CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INIT_PRIORITY (default 80). If the attached host processor starts a SPI transaction inside that window, the Rx-valid-length interrupt fires, shi_ite_int_handler() passes its state check and calls shi_ite_parse_header(), which stores the host-derived request length through the still-NULL data->rx_ctx. On the IT8xxx2 low addresses are not backed by RAM, and with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_PMP the first bytes of the address space are explicitly made inaccessible, so the store raises a fatal access fault in interrupt context. The window widens further when CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INITIALIZE_AT_BOOT is disabled and the application calls ec_host_cmd_init() itself. The result is a kernel panic on the embedded controller: with Zephyr's default fatal handler the CPU halts, so the controller stops servicing host commands until a hardware reset. Because the trigger is traffic from the attached host processor -- an untrusted peer from the controller firmware's point of view -- software on that host can provoke the fault by forcing a controller reset and issuing transactions during the reboot, turning a recoverable reset into a persistent outage. Impact is limited to availability: the faulting address is fixed and not attacker-chosen, so no memory-corruption primitive follows. The fix leaves the interface at SHI_STATE_DISABLED with the interrupt masked during device init, moves irq_enable() into shi_ite_backend_init() after the buffers are published, and makes shi_ite_int_handler() reject a NULL data->rx_ctx while write-clearing IT83XX_SPI_ISR and IT83XX_SPI_RX_VLISR so that an unexpected early interrupt cannot storm.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.7 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93668

Bluetooth BR/EDR SDP server blocks the Bluetooth workqueue indefinitely when the SDP buffer pool is empty

The Bluetooth Classic SDP server in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c allocated every response PDU through bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which expands to bt_l2cap_create_pdu() and therefore uses a K_FOREVER timeout. The allocation is made from sdp_pool, a fixed pool holding only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one in the default configuration) that is shared with the SDP client role. When the pool is empty the call blocks without a bound. The allocation is reached from bt_sdp_recv() on the Bluetooth host's RX context: the bt_workq "BT RX WQ" workqueue in the default configuration since v3.1.0, and the dedicated "BT RX" thread before that. This context processes all normal-priority HCI events and all received ACL data. The SDP L2CAP server is registered on PSM 0x0001 with no security requirement (BT_SECURITY_L0), so an unpaired, unauthenticated BR/EDR peer within radio range of a connectable device can drive it. Every malformed or unrecognised SDP PDU reaches send_err_rsp(), and the sdp_svc_search_req(), sdp_svc_att_req() and sdp_svc_search_att_req() handlers allocate as well, so a short burst of pipelined requests drains the pool and parks the RX context in the blocking allocation. A pool buffer is released only once its response has been sent, and a peer that withholds baseband acknowledgements keeps the controller's buffers for the link full, so the response is never sent. While the RX context is blocked, the entire Bluetooth host, for all connections and both LE and BR/EDR, stops processing normal-priority HCI events and received data. In most affected releases the stall is permanent. Queued PDUs are freed only by connection or channel teardown, which waits for the normal-priority Disconnection Complete handler, and that handler runs on the blocked RX context, so the host does not recover without a reset. In v3.7.0 through v4.1.x the TX processor discards the queued response once the link supervision timeout drops the connection, so each stall ends at that timeout, but the peer can reconnect and repeat it for as long as it stays in range. The impact is limited to availability; no memory corruption or information disclosure is involved. The fix adds sdp_svc_create_pdu() using K_NO_WAIT, pre-allocates the response buffer once in bt_sdp_recv(), stashes the request in sdp->recv_pending when no buffer is available, and retries it from a work handler once a buffer is freed by the pool destroy callback.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93666

Bluetooth Classic SDP client can deadlock the Bluetooth workqueue on buffer allocation

The Bluetooth Classic SDP client built its outgoing request PDUs with bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which allocates from the sdp_pool net-buf pool with a K_FOREVER timeout and no failure handling, in sdp_client_ss_search(), sdp_client_sa_search() and sdp_client_ssa_search() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. All of these run on the Bluetooth workqueue bt_workq (via sdp_client_work_handler(), the L2CAP sdp_client_connected() callback, or the continuation-state follow-up from a received response), which is the same single thread that dispatches incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, drives L2CAP, and performs connection and channel teardown. sdp_pool holds only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one by default) and is shared with the SDP server role. An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BT_SECURITY_L0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfp_hf_accept() calls bt_sdp_discover() through hfp_hf_create(), and hfp_ag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state. With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hci_disconn_complete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves bt_workq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix allocates client PDUs with K_NO_WAIT via a new sdp_client_create_pdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF flag, and adds an sdp_pool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with K_FOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-91007

Arbitrary supervisor-mode function pointer injection via charger_set_prop() syscall in the charger driver API

The user-mode syscall verifiers for the charger driver API in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c did not inspect the prop argument before copying union charger_propval across the user/kernel boundary. Two members of that union are function pointers — status_notification (CHARGER_PROP_STATUS_NOTIFICATION) and online_notification (CHARGER_PROP_ONLINE_NOTIFICATION), declared in include/zephyr/drivers/charger.h — and z_vrfy_charger_set_prop() forwarded the caller-supplied union verbatim to the driver's set_property callback for any property. z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() had the mirror defect and copied the stored kernel callback address back out to user memory. With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, any user-mode thread that has been granted a charger device object could call charger_set_prop() with CHARGER_PROP_STATUS_NOTIFICATION or CHARGER_PROP_ONLINE_NOTIFICATION and an arbitrary pointer value. Drivers that implement these properties — drivers/charger/charger_max20335.c, drivers/charger/charger_pf1550.c and drivers/charger/charger_bq2518x.c — store the pointer in device data and later invoke it from their interrupt work handlers, which run in supervisor mode, on any charger state change such as a cable plug/unplug. The result is a control-flow hijack at kernel privilege from an unprivileged thread, defeating the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide; the read path additionally disclosed a kernel code address to user mode, and clearing a notifier installed by a supervisor thread let user mode suppress charger notifications. Supervisor-mode callers of charger_set_prop()/charger_get_prop() are unaffected. The fix makes both verifiers reject the two notifier properties outright — including when the supplied callback is NULL, since the notifiers are device state — and adds a BUILD_ASSERT on CHARGER_PROP_COMMON_COUNT so that new properties force a re-review of the union's user-mode safety.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-19809

Kernel stack information disclosure in the charger_get_prop() system call handler

The user-mode system call verifier z_vrfy_charger_get_prop() in drivers/charger/charger_handlers.c declares an uninitialized union charger_propval k_val on the kernel (privileged) stack, passes it to the charger driver back end via z_impl_charger_get_prop(), and then copies the full sizeof(union charger_propval) back into the calling user thread's buffer with k_usermode_to_copy(). That discloses kernel stack contents on two paths: On error. The copy-out ignores the driver's return code. In-tree back ends return an error without writing through the value pointer for properties they do not implement: charger_gpio_get_prop() returns -ENOTSUP unconditionally, and bq24190_get_prop() has a default: return -ENOTSUP; arm that never touches val. The whole union is then stack residue. On success. A back end writes only the one union member the requested property selects (for example sbs_charger.c writes the one-byte val->present for CHARGER_PROP_PRESENT and returns 0), yet the handler still copies the whole union, so every byte beyond that member is uninitialized. The handler is compiled only when CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and is reachable by any user-mode thread that has been granted access to a charger device object. K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_CHARGER() validates only the device object and its API pointer, not the property identifier, so an unprivileged thread can choose prop freely: an unimplemented property forces the error path, a narrow one the success path, and the call can be repeated at will. Each call discloses up to the size of the union (12 bytes on a 32-bit target, 16 bytes on 64-bit targets where the function-pointer members widen it) of supervisor-stack memory. The bytes are residue of earlier kernel-side frames on the thread's privileged stack and can contain kernel object addresses and saved return addresses, which an unprivileged thread cannot otherwise observe and which help defeat address-layout assumptions when exploiting a separate memory-safety defect. There is no integrity or availability impact. Two commits fix it, and both are needed. 5054384e983c skips the copy-out when the back end reports an error. c31cac727d02 zeroes the union before the driver call, so the bytes copied out on success are driver-written data or zeros. A tree carrying only the first still leaks on every successful call.

CVSS 3.1 · 3.3 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-92241

Bluetooth Classic AVRCP browsing channel can deadlock the Bluetooth receive thread, hanging the host

The AVRCP browsing channel's L2CAP receive-buffer callback, browsing_avrcp_l2cap_alloc_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c, allocated from the shared avctp_browsing_rx_pool with K_FOREVER. L2CAP invokes that callback from the Bluetooth RX work queue thread (bt_workq, "BT RX WQ"), both for the head buffer of a new SDU and — through l2cap_br_alloc_frag() and net_buf_append_bytes() — for every further fragment of a reassembled SDU. That same thread is the only context that ever releases these buffers, after bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() delivers a completed SDU and calls net_buf_unref(), so a wait taken there can never be satisfied. The pool holds CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN + 1 buffers of CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING_L2CAP_MTU bytes (two buffers of 339 bytes in the default configuration). A connected browsing peer can drain it because bt_l2cap_br_recv_seg() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c accepts the SDU length declared in an SAR_START segment without bounding it by br_chan->rx.mtu: a peer that announces a large SDU and then streams continuation segments forces one pool buffer per segment-worth of data. Once the pool is empty the next allocation blocks forever inside the callback. Triggering the flaw requires a build with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and the experimental CONFIG_BT_AVRCP_BROWSING option, an application that registers AVRCP callbacks, and a BR/EDR peer that has established the AVRCP control channel and then the browsing channel, which requires an encrypted (paired) link. No malformed packet is needed — a few hundred bytes of ordinary segmented L2CAP traffic suffice. The consequence is a permanent hang of the whole Bluetooth host, not just of AVRCP: the blocked thread drains bt_dev.rx_queue for all HCI ACL data and low-priority events and also runs the host's internal work items, so all connections stop being serviced and the state is unrecoverable without a reboot. There is no memory-corruption or information-disclosure component. The fix allocates with K_NO_WAIT, so an empty pool now yields a local-busy indication or a channel disconnect that the application can recover from.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.7 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-93667

Function pointer type confusion in Zephyr Virtual L2 when a VLAN-tagged frame finds no handling virtual interface

The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled). The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check. The resulting call passes a struct net_if where the driver expects a struct device and a struct net_pkt where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive. The same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-90832

Out-of-bounds read in Bluetooth Host periodic advertising report reassembly due to unvalidated report length

bt_hci_le_per_adv_report_common() in subsys/bluetooth/host/scan.c handles the HCI_LE_Periodic_Advertising_Report (and _v2) event. It verified that the fixed event header was present and that the controller-declared Data_Length fits the tailroom of the periodic-sync reassembly buffer, but never checked that the event actually carried as many data bytes as evt->length claims. Both reassembly paths — DATA_STATUS_PARTIAL, and DATA_STATUS_COMPLETE while a chain is already in progress — then called net_buf_simple_add_mem(&per_adv_sync->reassembly, buf->data, evt->length), copying up to 255 bytes starting past the end of the event's real payload. The Data_Length field originates in the HCI controller, so the flaw is reachable in host-only/split builds where the controller is a separate part reached over H4 UART, SPI, USB or an inter-core IPC transport: a malicious, compromised or buggy controller (or an attacker able to inject on that link) can send a report declaring a length larger than the event payload. The generic event dispatcher in subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c only enforces a per-event minimum length and never cross-checks the subevent's internal length field, so nothing else catches it. Builds using Zephyr's own in-image controller are not affected, because the controller always emits a length matching the bytes it appends. Exploitation additionally requires CONFIG_BT_PER_ADV_SYNC with CONFIG_BT_PER_ADV_SYNC_BUF_SIZE > 0 (the option defaults to 0, which compiles the reassembly block out; LE Audio broadcast-sink and Public Broadcast Profile applications that reassemble fragmented periodic advertising data set it), and an established periodic advertising sync. The consequence is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent HCI RX-pool memory — including stale contents of previously received HCI events — which is copied into the reassembly buffer and then delivered to every registered bt_le_per_adv_sync_cb.recv listener as if it were received advertising data, so the disclosed memory becomes application-visible and may be forwarded off-device. The write side remains in bounds because the tailroom check uses the same length value, so there is no memory corruption; impact is limited to information disclosure and undefined behaviour on the over-read. The fix drops any report whose declared length exceeds the remaining event payload, matching the guard already present in the extended and legacy advertising report handlers.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-90833

Signed offset bypasses bounds check in simulated EEPROM driver, allowing out-of-bounds kernel memory read and write from user mode

The simulated EEPROM driver validated access ranges in eeprom_range_is_valid() (drivers/eeprom/eeprom_simulator.c) with a single test, (offset + len) <= config->size. Because offset is a signed off_t and len an unsigned size_t of the same rank, the addition is evaluated in unsigned arithmetic: a negative offset combined with a compensating len wraps the sum back into the accepted range. eeprom_sim_read() and eeprom_sim_write() then memcpy() through the EEPROM(addr) macro, which is plain pointer arithmetic on the driver's static mock_eeprom array, so the copy addresses memory located before that array. eeprom_read() and eeprom_write() are __syscall entry points, and their verification handlers in drivers/eeprom/eeprom_handlers.c check only the device object and the caller's own data buffer (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE) — the offset argument is passed to the driver unvalidated. With CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a CONFIG_EEPROM_SIMULATOR device instance, and the device object granted to a user thread (the usage the in-tree tests/drivers/eeprom/api suite exercises from ZTEST_USER threads), an unprivileged thread could supply a negative offset and have the kernel perform the copy on its behalf. The result is an out-of-bounds read of kernel .bss returned into the caller's buffer and, via the write path, an out-of-bounds write of caller-supplied bytes over kernel memory preceding mock_eeprom. Both the start address and the length of the affected span are attacker-selected, so the primitive is sufficient to corrupt adjacent kernel state and escape the user-mode sandbox. Exposure is limited to builds that instantiate the simulated EEPROM (status = "okay" by default on qemu_x86 and native_sim, otherwise added by a devicetree overlay) together with userspace isolation. The fix rejects negative offsets and performs the remaining bound check without overflow.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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CVE-2026-90834

UART wide-data syscall verifiers check the 8-bit driver op, allowing a user-mode thread to trigger a NULL function-pointer call in kernel mode

The user-mode syscall verifiers for the 16-bit ("wide data") UART API in drivers/serial/uart_handlers.c validated the wrong driver operation. z_vrfy_uart_poll_out_u16(), z_vrfy_uart_tx_u16() and z_vrfy_uart_rx_enable_u16() each ran K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_UART() against the 8-bit op (poll_out, tx, rx_enable) rather than the 16-bit op that the corresponding implementation dereferences (poll_out_u16, tx_u16, rx_enable_u16). z_impl_uart_poll_out_u16(), z_impl_uart_tx_u16() and z_impl_uart_rx_enable_u16() in include/zephyr/drivers/uart/uart_internal.h call their op unconditionally, with no NULL guard of their own, because the verifier is supposed to have established that the op exists. CONFIG_UART_WIDE_DATA is an application-selectable option that no driver selects, and only a handful of the serial drivers in the tree implement any _u16 operation; every other driver leaves those struct uart_driver_api members NULL while still providing the 8-bit ops the old check inspected. In a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_UART_WIDE_DATA (plus CONFIG_UART_ASYNC_API for the uart_tx_u16() and uart_rx_enable_u16() variants), an unprivileged user-mode thread that legitimately holds access to such a UART device object can invoke the _u16 syscall: the object, permission and op checks all pass, and the kernel-side implementation then performs an indirect call through a NULL function pointer while running at supervisor privilege. The result is a CPU exception taken in kernel context instead of the intended K_OOPS or -ENOSYS return. With the default k_sys_fatal_error_handler() this halts the system (or warm-reboots it under CONFIG_RESET_ON_FATAL_ERROR), so a thread confined by the userspace sandbox can deny service to the whole device — a capability the user-mode privilege boundary is specifically meant to withhold. The call target is a fixed NULL, so there is no attacker-controlled code execution and no memory disclosure; the separate K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_ARRAY_READ()/K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_ARRAY_WRITE() bounds checks on the caller's buffer were and remain correct. The fix points each verifier at the matching _u16 op, using a plain K_SYSCALL_OBJ() object check where the op does not exist or where the implementation already tests it for NULL.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
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